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Patentability of Software Technology*
Advanced computer technology, while of inestimable value to
business and industry, has sparked serious controversy over the
question of patentability of computer-related inventions.1 The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA), and United States Supreme Court2 have yet to
agree upon any clear-cut guidelines as to when processes involving
computerized steps are patentable under the Patent Act.'
Before addressing the specific issue of patentability of computer related inventions, a general explanation of the requirements
of the Patent Act is in order. For any invention to be patentable it
must meet four requirements: (1) it must be statutory subject matter;' (2) it must have utility; (3) it must be novel;' and (4) it must
be nonobvious. Whether an invention constitutes statutory subject
matter is a threshold issue because absent such a finding, the issues of utility, novelty and nonobviousness need not be addressed
by the patent examiner.8 To be eligible for patent protection, the
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not
reflect those of their employers.
1. For a thorough discussion of the major computer-related cases see Blumenthal & Riter, Statutory or Nonstatutory?:An Analysis of the Patentabilityof
Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 454 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Blumenthal].
2. The Court's most recent expression of computer technology patentability
was Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). The two other Supreme Court cases
dealing with computer-related inventions are Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972), and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). (This paper does 'not consider
the case of Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981) because affirmation of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals resulted from an equally divided Supreme
Court and, therefore, the Court's opinion is of questionable precedential value.)
*

3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976).

4. The Act defines statutory subject matter as "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.

.

." Id..§ 101.

5. Any patentable invention, discovery or improvement must be "useful." Id.
6. The requirement of novelty is set out in § 101. The definition of novelty is
set out in § 102.
7. The requirement of nonobviousness is set out in § 103 of the Act. "[T]he
subject matter sought to be patented . . . [must not] have been obvious at the
time the invention was made. ..."

8. See Judge Rich's opinion in In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
for his discussion of the application of §§ 101, 102 and 103.
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invention must be a process,9 machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."0 Much of the dispute between the PTO, CCPA,
and the Supreme Court regarding the patentability of computer
related inventions centers on whether a process which employs a
computer or computer program properly can be considered statutory subject matter.11 There are practical, policy and analytical aspects to this issue.
In practical terms, if an invention is found not to be statutory
subject matter, the PTO is relieved of the burden of examining the
invention to determine its utility, novelty and nonobviousness, a
task which may be of considerable magnitude. As early as 1965, a
Presidental Commission recommended that computer programs be
expressly excluded from patent protection because of the potentially awesome task of examination.1" The Commission's report
1 " being
creates the image of an already overworked examining staff
swamped with an ocean of patent applications all differing only in
the computer program employed.
Although the realities of administrative burden have to be
taken into consideration by the PTO, the purpose of the Patent
Act must dictate the scope of statutory subject matter." The in9. Section 100(b) provides: "(b) The term "process" means process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material."
10. Section 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."
11. See Blumenthal, supra note 1.
12. The Commission stated in its report:
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of the lack of a classification technique and the requisite search
files. Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible
or economic because of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Without this search, the patenting of programs would be tantamont
to mere registration and the presumption of patent validity would be all
but nonexistent.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM,

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ***

ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY
MISSION REPORT].

USEFUL

13 (1966) [hereinafter cited as COM-

13. The patent examination staff consisted of 949 employees in 1980 and the
total number of patent applications filed and pending during that year was
329,318. See COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 1980 (1981).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides in part: "The Congress shall have

[1982:471]

PATENTABILITY OF SOFTWARE

tent of the Patent Act is to promote the useful arts and to enrich
society through innovation." It can be argued that to fulfill this
policy, the scope of statutory subject matter should be given expansive interpretation in order to encompass new technology. Indeed, both the CCPA and the Supreme Court have recently interpreted section 101 to include a man-made microorganism as
statutory subject matter, finding it a manufacture or composition
of matter.16 It would seem reasonable to interpret section 101 as
broadly with respect to inventions utilizing computer programs in
order to promote innovation in computer technology.
It is well-established that an invention which is a new process
or method comprising one or more steps is patentable if the other
three requirements of the statute are met.1 7 For example, a threestep process for making gasoline from water would be a patentable
method if the requirements of utility, novelty and nonobviousness
were met. However, consider the situation where one of the three
steps in this otherwise patentable process calls for a series of calculations to be performed on a computer, and for certain adjustments to be made to the process on the basis of the calculations.
Would a process otherwise statutory subject matter become nonstatutory merely because one of the steps required that a series of
calculations be performed on a computer? Moreover, does it matter if the calculations are well-known within the industry, or conversely, if they were formulated for the first time by the inventor?
The logic of the argument that a process is non-statutory
when one of its steps calls for calculations to be performed by a
computer may be understood by analogizing process steps to
mental activity. It has been a tenet of patent law that mental steps
or processes are not patentable.18 Thus, the discovery of a new
mathematical equation describing or predicting a phenomenon
Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." This clause confers upon Congress the power to provide for copyrights and patents. See generally 1 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON
PATENTs § 10 (2d ed. 1964).
15. Thomas Jefferson, the drafter of the Patent Act of 1793, expressed the
view that intellectual property did not stem from a natural rights theory. He
viewed the patent system as a method of inducing an inventor to disclose his
discovery so that society might benefit from new knowledge and innovation. See
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1966).
16. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
18. See Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 455.
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would not be a statutory subject matter. Likewise, it could be argued that under such an analysis a computer program or computer
algorithm19 is nothing more than a series of unpatentable mental
steps. Accepting the notion of the nonpatentability of the step involving computer calculations does not clarify the status of the entire process. Should an otherwise statutory process become nonstatutory subject matter simply because one of the process steps
employs an unpatentable computer program or algorithm? The
PTO has answered this question in the affirmative. It has been the
Office's view that process steps employing computer calculations or
algorithms are equivalent to unpatentable mental steps which
render the entire process nonstatutory and unpatentable. 0
The purpose of this paper is to review the Supreme Court's
holding in Diehr and analyze it in view of the Court's two earlier
decisions. The holding in Diehr will then be contrasted with the
CCPA's analysis of processes utilizing computers and a prediction
is made as to the likely impact of the Diehr decision.
THE SUPREME COURT'S PRIOR DECISIONS

The Supreme Court had considered the patentability of inventions involving computer programs in two decisions prior to Diehr.
The first, Gottschalk v. Benson,'1 involved claims for a method of
converting signals from binary coded decimal numerals into pure
binary numerals. The key to the method was an algorithm for effecting the conversion. The CCPA had reversed a PTO finding that
the claimed method was not statutory subject matter,"' and the
Supreme Court in turn reversed the CCPA. The Court found the
claimed method so abstract that it could be performed without the
19. In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972), the Supreme Court defined an "algorithm" as "[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem." The CCPA has pointed out that generally the term "algorithm" has a
broader meaning and that the term generally refers to a step-by-step procedure
for solving a problem or accomplishing some end. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152,

156 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1976). However, the CCPA found that the Supreme Court intended its analysis to apply only to mathematical algorithms such as the one in

Benson and so the Court narrowly defined the term "algorithm." Id.

See also Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 455.
20. This view was first expressed in In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A.

1969). The PTO has repeated its view in numerous other cases. See Blumenthal,
supra note 1, at 456.
21. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
22. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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use of any apparatus.2 8 Therefore, determining that this method
constituted statutory subject matter would be equivalent to permitting a mental step or idea to be patented.2 4 The Court emphasized that the algorithm had no substantial, practical application
except in connection with a digital computer." If the Court found
the method patentable subject matter and a patent issued on the
method, then the patentee would have exclusive rights to the only
practical application of the algorithm. Therefore, a patent on the
method would, for all practical purposes, "preempt" use of the algorithm and be equivalent to finding a mathematical formula patentable subject matter.26 According to Benson, a claimed process
employing an algorithm is unpatentable subject matter if it
preempts all practical uses of the algorithm.
The second decision, Parker v. Flook,'7 concerned claims for a
method of adjusting alarm settings for process variables in a hydrocarbon conversion process. The alarms were warning devices
which were set to respond when a process variable such as temperature exceeded a predetermined value or limit. Flook's invention
was a method of automatically adjusting the alarm limit. This automatic adjustment was to relieve the process operator from the
necessity of manually adjusting the alarm limit when an adjustment was made to the process variable. The patent claims of the
inventor indicated the use of a specific mathematical algorithm for
adjusting the alarm limit. The PTO had rejected the claims as directed to an unpatentable method of calculation. The CCPA had
reversed the PTO's decision28 and, as in the pattern established in
Benson, the Supreme Court reversed the CCPA. The Court found
the only novel feature of the claimed method was the algorithm.2'9
Since the patenting of algorithms, per se, was precluded in Benson, the Court framed the issue as whether the step of adjusting
the alarm limit (characterized by the Court as a post-solution step)
'23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

409 U.S. at 68.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 72.
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977).

The PTO had found the claims directed to an unpatentable method of calculation; however, the CCPA found the claimed method patentable subject matter
under Benson. The CCPA held that the algorithm was not preempted because the
claimed method called for the post-solution step of adjusting the alarm limit to
match the numerical value calculated by the use of the algorithm. Id. at 23.

29. 437 U.S. at 586.
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to match the numerical value calculated by use of the algorithm is
sufficient to make the method patentable subject matter.3 0 The
Court concluded that it was not. The obvious and trivial step of
updating the alarm limit to the calculated value was found by the
Court insufficient to make the method patentable.3 1 Flook stands
for the proposition that a process employing an algorithm is not
made patentable subject matter by a trivial or insignificant postsolution step.32
THE COURT'S DECISION IN

Diehr

In Diehr, the Supreme Court ruled that claims drawn to an
improved method of operating a process for molding raw, uncured
synthetic rubber into cured precision rubber products utilizing a
digital computer system constituted statutory subject matter.83
Diehr's invention involved use of a digital computer system to determine the amount of time necessary to properly cure rubber in a
molding press.3 4 Under program control, the computer continuously monitored the varying temperatures of the mold and calculated the amount of time necessary to cure the rubber. The calculations involved repeated solution of the well-known Arrhenius
formula. When the computer determined on the basis of these calculations that sufficient time had lapsed, heating of the molding
press was ceased, and the press automatically opened when the
molded rubber cooled to the desired temperature.
Setting the tone for its analysis the Court stated, "[A] claim
30. Id. at 585.

31. Id. at 590. As some commentators have observed with regret, after holding Flook's claim unpatentable, the court proceeded to obfuscate its interpreta-

tions of § 101 with considerations of novelty and obviousness which are more ap-

propriately addressed under §§ 102 and 103. See Blumenthal, supra note 1, at
485. See also Judge Rich's terse opinion in Bergy where he tongue lashes the Solicitor General for inducing the Supreme Court into confusing the requirements of
§§ 101, 102, and 103 in the Government brief in Flook. 596 F.2d at 962.
32. It is of interest to note also that in Flook the court rejected the argument
that the claimed method be found patentable because it did not preempt the use
of the algorithms in accordance with Benson. 437 U.S. at 589-90.
33. "[W]e think that a physical and chemical process for molding precision
synthetic rubber products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter." 450 U.S. 175, 184. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Justice Rehnquist and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
White and Powell. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, in which Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackman joined. Id. at 193.
34. Id. at 187.
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drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer
program, or digital computer."35 Diehr's invention was claimed as a
process and the Court posited that its patentability was not dependent on the step using a computer program or a digital computer,
but rather on the process as a whole representing statutory subject
matter.36
Thus, the issue was framed as whether Diehr's claimed process
as a whole was representative of the type of process traditionally
constituting statutory subject matter. In making this determination the Court stated:
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular
form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. A process
is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject
matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or
may not be new or patentable; while the process itself may be
altogether new and produce an entirely new result. The process
requires that certain things should be done with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing
this may be of secondary consequence."
The Court's definition of a patentable process, which originated in
Cochrane v. Deener,8 restricts statutory processes to those producing a transformation on the subject material irrespective of the
instrumentalities used to effect the transformation. Applying the
Cochrane definition, the Court had little trouble in finding Diehr's
process statutory subject matter. The Court stated:
That respondent's claims involve the transformation of an article,
in this case raw uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or
thing cannot be disputed. The respondent's claims describe in detail a step-by-step method for accomplishing such beginning with
the loading of a mold with raw uncured rubber and ending with
the eventual opening of the press at the conclusion of the cure.
35. Id.

36. In addition, the Court stated: "In determining the eligibility of respon-

dents' claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole." Id. at 188.

37. Id. at 182.

38. 94 U.S. 780 (1877).
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Industrial processes such as this are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws. 3'
The Court discussed its holding in Benson and, relying on
Flook, indicated that whether the claims preempt the algorithm is
not determinative of the issue of patentable subject matter.40 A
process of employing an algorithm is not made patentable subject
matter upon showing that all uses of the algorithm are not preempted."1 However, the Court found that Diehr's claims did not
preempt the Arrhenius equation." Reviewing its holding in Flook,
the Court stated:
A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of
our patent laws.... [T]his principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.... Similarly, insignificant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process . .. . On the other hand, when a claim containing a
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a
structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing the article to a different state
or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.40
The Court's statement affirms the insignificant post-solution
test set out in Flook." In accordance with Diehr then, a claimed
process 4 5 which applies a mathematical algorithm in effecting the
subject transformation constitutes statutory subject matter notwithstanding use of the algorithm. To the extent that the algorithm is an integral part of the transformation, post-solution use
of the quantities generated by the algorithm is not an insignificant
one within the meaning of Flook."
39. 450 U.S. at 184.
40. 450 U.S. at 192 n.14.
41. Id.

42. The court stated: "In contrast, the respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula ....
Their process admittedly employs a well known

mathematical equation, but they do not seek to preempt the use of that equation." Id. at 187.
43. Id. at 191.
44. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. Blumenthal and Riter engage in an interesting exercise in claim drafting.
They point out that on the basis of the CCPA's decision in In re Diehr, it is
possible to redraft the claims into a presumably non-statutory format under the
Supreme Court's holding in Flook. This could be done by claiming Diehr's inven-
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE

Diehr DECISION

The CCPA has developed a two-step analysis for determining
whether claims involving a computer are drawn to statutory subject matter.47 The analysis was first posited by the CCPA in In re
8 The first step of the analysis calls
Freeman."
for a determination
of whether the claims recite a mathematical algorithm as defined
in Benson. If the claims do not receite such an algorithm then the
claims constitute statutory subject matter. However, assuming the
claims do recite such an algorithm, the second step requires a determination of whether the claims wholly preempt the algorithm
for all applications.49 In Flook, the Court rejected the notion that
absolute "preemption" of an algorithm is determinitive of whether
a process employing the algorithm is statutory. 0 Since the "preemption" test of Benson was no longer viable, the CCPA reshaped
the second step in the Freeman analysis.
The modified second step in the Freeman analysis requires a
tion as a "method of calculating the cure time of a rubber molding process," as
opposed to claiming the invention as an improved method of operating a rubber
molding press. Thus, whether the invention constitutes statutory subject matter
depends on the skill of the patent draftsman. The authors speculated that it
might trouble the Supreme Court if the same invention might be capable of
claiming in a statutory and non-statutory manner. Blumenthal, supra note 1, at
505-06.
This issue was not addressed in the majority opinion, but the dissenting opinion took note of it and found it a basis for holding Diehr's invention unpatentable. 450 U.S. at 210 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. See Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 482, 511.
48. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Freeman's claims were directed to a computer program used to typeset mathematical equations. Conventional hardware
was used. The CCPA stated that test as follows:
Determination of whether a claim preempts nonstatutory subject matter
as a whole, in the light of Benson, requires a two-step analysis. First, it
must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly recites an
'algorithm' in the Benson sense of that term, for a claim which fails even
to recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly preempt an algorithm. Second, the claim must be further analyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm.
Id. at 1245.
49. This second step of the Freeman analysis was modified by the CCPA in
In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980), in response to the Supreme Court's
holding in Flook. Walter's invention related to seismic prospecting and surveying.
His method involved doing cross-correlation calculations on returned signals recorded during seismic prospecting. The result of the calculations were pure numbers which did not represent a physical signal.
50. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 586.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

determination of whether the algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships between the physical
elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to "refine" or
"limit" claim steps (in process claims).' 1 If the algorithm is so
used, the claims are found to define patentable subject matter.
Therefore, for a process employing an algorithm to pass muster
under the second step of the "modified Freeman" analysis the process must utilize the algorithm in a manner that affects the process
steps. For example, the solution of the algorithm may be used to
"limit" the duration or temperature of a process step or to "refine"
the process step by determining alternative subsequent process
steps.
A review of the CCPA's "modified Freeman" analysis in light
of the Supreme Court's holding in Diehr indicates that the twostep test remains at least partly viable.'5 In Diehr, the Court indicated that it was not passing judgment on the patentability of
processes not utilizing an algorithm as defined in Benson." Thus,
it is not clear that the Supreme Court agrees with the test of the
first step in the "modified Freeman" analysis. But, assuming that
the claims do recite an algorithm, is the second step of the "modified Freeman" analysis consonant with the Supreme Court's holding in Diehr? It would certainly appear so to the extent that the
algorithm is used to refine or limit process steps (in accordance
with the "modified Freeman" analysis) and to the extent the
claimed process utilizes that algorithm in transforming or reducing
the process's subject matter." In the Diehr example, the use of the
Arrhenius formula limited the duration of the cure step of the sub51. The CCPA stated: "If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships between the
physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim
steps (in process claims), the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes
muster under § 101." 618 F.2d at 767.
52. It is of interest to note that although aware of the CCPA's use of the
"modified Freeman" analysis in In re Diehr, the Supreme Court did not adopt
this test. This would seem to indicate that the Court is not in complete agreement
with the CCPA's analysis at this time.
53. The Court indicated that simply because a mathematical formula was not
involved did not of necessity make the subject matter patentable. The Court
stated: "Our previous decisions regarding the patentability of 'algorithms' are necessarily limited to the more narrow definition employed by the Court and we do
not pass judgment on whether processes falling outside the definition previously
used by the Court ... would be patentable subject matter." 450 U.S. at 186 n.9.
54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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ject process and, thus, was instrumental in effecting the transformation of the process subject matter, the uncured rubber.
In addition to the apparent continued viability of the CCPA's
"modified Freeman" analysis, a second important implication of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Diehr must be considered. As
noted above, the Supreme Court found Diehr's invention statutory
subject matter because the claimed process as a whole was patentable subject matter. The Court came to this conclusion by applying
the Cochrane definition of a statutory process. A question which
must necessarily be asked is whether the Cochrane definition is the
exclusive definition of a statutory process. Thus, could a process
not meeting the Cochrane definition which employs a computer related step still be found to be statutory subject matter?
In both Flook and Benson, the Supreme Court indicated that
the Cochrane definition was not the exclusive definition of a statutory process.55 The Court's opinion in Diehr contained no statement on the exclusivity of the Cochrane definition. However, as
early as 1934, the CCPA indicated in In re Ernst" that it did not
consider the Cochrane definition to be the exclusive definition of a
statutory process. In commenting on the Cochrane definition, the
CCPA stated: "Insofar as the language . . . implies that a valid

method claim requires that it relate to the treatment of some material, we are not in accord therewith."5 7 In denying the exclusivity
of the Cochrane definition, the CCPA relied on Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co.5 The CCPA considered that a method of
transmitting sounds telegraphically could not be considered to fall
within the Cochrane definition since the method did not relate to
treatment of a material so as to transform it into another thing.'9
55. In Parker v. Flook the Court stated:
The statutory definition of 'process' is broad....
An argument can be
made, however, that this court has only recognized a process as within
the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus
or operated to change materials to a 'different state or thing'. . . . As in
Benson, we assume that a valid process patent may issue even if it does
not meet one of these qualifications of our earlier precedents ....
In
Benson, we phrased the issue in this way: 'The question is whether the
method described and claimed is a "process" within the meaning of the
Patent Act.'
437 U.S. 588-89 nn.9 & 10 (citations omitted).
56. 71 F.2d 169 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
57. Id. at 170.
58. 126 U.S. 1 (1887) (the 'Telephone Cases').
59. 71 F.2d at 170.
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However, the Supreme Court found that a method of transmitting
sound waves via electrical impulses constituted a statutory process.
Furthermore, in In re Prater" the CCPA set forth what it considered the actual scope of the Cochrane definition when it stated:
This passage has sometimes been misconstrued as a 'rule' or 'definition' requiring that all processes, to be patentable, must operate
physically upon substances. Such a result misapprehends the nature of the passage quoted as dictum, in its context, and the question being discussed by the author of the opinion. To deduce such
a rule from the statement would be contrary to its intendment
which was not to limit process patentability but to point out that
a process is not limited to the means used in performing it.61

If the CCPA does not consider the Cochrane definition exclusive, the question of what it does consider the measure of a statutory process arises. In In re Sakar' the CCPA stated: "[A] series
of steps is a process within § 101 unless it falls within a judicially
determined category of nonstatutory subject matter exceptions." 68
Thus, the CCPA defines a statutory process in the negative, as one
not falling in the express categories of non-statutory exceptions.
Because it is defined in the negative, the CCPA's definition of a
statutory process is much broader in scope than the Cochrane definition and could result in a much broader range of processes being
found patentable.
The principal category of non-statutory subject matter exceptions dealt with by the CCPA in analyzing comuter related inventions is those processes which are found to be methods of pure calculation or mere mathematical exercises.6 4 The claimed processes
in In re Waldbaum," In re Gelnovatch," In re Richman,7 In re
60. 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
61. Id. at 1403 (footnote omitted).
62. 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The invention in Sakar concerned a
method of constructing a mathematical model of an open channel for providing
data on the flow of rivers.
63. Id. at 1333.
64. See generally Blumenthal, supra note 1.

65. 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1977). The method involved low-level calculations

to determine the number of "l's" in a binary word. This determination was accomplished by doing a series of shift and compare operations. No mathematical
algorithm was involved in these operations. The following representative claim

defines the inventions:
1. In the data processor of a processor-controlled telephone switching
system having a register into which a bit pattern of l's and O's respectively representing the busy and idle states of a plurality of telephone
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lines is entered, said data processor including a memory for storing data
and instruction words as respective addresses; means for normally controlling the sequential execution of successively addressed instruction
words; a plurality of registers; means for storing memory data words in
said registers; means for performing logical operations on data words in
said registers; said logical operations performing means including means
for comparing the contents of predetermined ones of said plurality of
registers; and means responsive to the execution of a predetermined instruction word for examining the data word contained in a predetermined first one of said registers, changing the rightmost 1 in said first
register to an 0 if said register contains at least one 1, controlling a transfer to the instruction word at a specified address in said data processor
memory if said first register contains all O's, and storing in a predetermined second one of said registers the address of the following instruction word if said transfer is made; a method of operating said data
processor to count the number of busy ones of said telephone lines represented in said register comprising the steps of:
(1) controlling said storing means to store a memory data word
whose number of l's must be counted in said first register,
(2) controlling the data processor to execute a series of identical
ones of said predetermined instruction word, and
(3) comparing in said comparing means the address of a first of the
instruction words in said series with the content of said second register when a transfer is made during the execution of one of the
instruction words in said series to derive the number of l's in said
data word.
Id. at 613.
66. 595 F.2d 32 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
The method determined a set of component values so that a mathematical
model of a microwave circuit would have the desired characteristics. The method
was an iterative process for determining the required set of component values.
The CCPA simplified the first claim of Gelnovatch's application by deleting the
microwave terminology to arrive at the following(1) arbitrarily select a set of numbers;
(2) calculate an answer by means of equations which use the selected set
of numbers;
(3) computationally check to see whether the calculated answer is acceptable; if not,
(4) repeatedly calculate different sets of numbers from previous sets and
do the calculations of (2) and (3) until an acceptable answer is
calculated;
(5) call the last set of numbers selected the "Process outputs."
Id. at 35.
The CCPA stated with respect to these claims:
Although the line separating statutory processes from nonstatutory
processes is unclear, the mere presence of a calculation or the computer
implementation of the method does not mandate a holding that the
claimed procedure is not a 'process' within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §
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Walter," and Sakar 9 were all found by the CCPA to be unpatentable methods of calculation. However, as indicated by the "modified Freeman" analysis,7 the CCPA does not find the presence of
an algorithm in a claimed process fatal. If the process can meet the
second step test by implementing the algorithm to limit or refine
the process steps then, notwithstanding the presence of the algorithm, the process is statutory. The processes claimed in
Waldbaum, Gelnovatch, Richman, Walter and Sakar all failed to
meet the second step of the "modified Freeman" analysis because
the calculations were not used to limit or refine process steps.
Rather, these processes were more like mathematical exercises for
the generation of pure numbers. Accordingly, they would also fall
to meet the Cochrane definition in that the claimed processes
could not be considered as modes of treating materials to produce
given results.
An interesting case to consider as perhaps defining the borderline of patentability between the Cochrane definition and the sec7
ond step of the "modified Freeman" analysis is In re Johnson.
Johnson concerned a method of filtering unwanted background
101. But, where, as here, the claims solely recite a method whereby a set
of numbers [are generated] by merely performing a series of mathematical computations, the claims do not set forth a statutory process.
Id. at 41-42.
67. 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977). The CCPA stated that the invention in
this case:
involves a method of calculating (according to a mathematical formula)
an average boresight correction angle for an airborne, coherent pulse
doppler, synthetic aperture, signal processing radar, using actual terrain
measurements, and a method of calculating (according to a mathematical
formula) the average vertical velocity component of the aircraft carrying
the radar, using these same measurements.
Id. at 1027.
Antecedent steps were involved in obtaining data for use in the mathematical
formula. The CCPA stated "notwithstanding that the antecedent steps are novel
and unobvious, they merely determine values for the variables used in the mathematical formulae used in making the calculations. Thus, such antecedent steps do
not suffice to render the claimed methods, considered as a whole, statutory subject matter." Id. at 1030.
68. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The invention related to seismic prospecting and surveying. Walter's method involved doing cross-correlation calculations
on returned signals which were recorded during seismic prospecting. The results
of these calculations were pure numbers which did not represent a physical signal.
69. See supra note 57.
70. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
71. 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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signals or noise from data obtained during seismic testing. The
method involved algorithmic manipulation of the seismic data. The
CCPA determined that the process steps did involve mathematical
calculations but that the calculations were incidental to filtering
the noise from the data. In finding the method comprised statutory
subject matter the court stated: "[T]he significant limitations recited in the claims of operating on a recorded, unenhanced seismic
trace to produce and record a new seismic trace lead us to find the
claims to recite statutory processes and not methods of calculating
as were present in Flook."' Thus, the CCPA apparently viewed
the algorithmic manipulation of the data as if it were an operation
on the data. Viewed in this way, it would seem to meet the second
step of the "modified Freeman" analysis to the extent that the manipulation and filtering of the data "refines" and "limits" the process steps. Moreover, the court's opinion in Johnson seemed to
place heavy emphasis on the fact that the seismic data was representative of the actual physical seismic trace and was not merely a
pure number.78
It is not clear whether or not Johnson's claimed invention
would meet the Cochrane definition of a statutory process. An argument could be made that it would qualify because the algorithmic manipulations operated on the unfiltered data to
produce filtered data. If the data were viewed as the subject material of the operation, then certainly the mathematical filtering of
the data could be viewed as a transformation. However, it seems
that the CCPA's view of the Cochrane defintion is more narrow.
The CCPA considered that Bell's method of transmitting sound
telegraphically did not fall within the Cochrane definition of a
72. Id. at 1078.
73. In Walter, the CCPA distinguished the invention in Johnson by stating:
In Johnson, a seismic trace containing superimposed noise was subjected
to signal processing by computer. As a result of the processing the unwanted noise component was removed from the trace. In order to make a
trace palatable to a computer, it must sometimes be converted to a computer-compatible format. One method of doing this is to sample the amplitude of the signal at regular intervals and convert the resulting amplitude value to a binary equivalent form. The resulting noiseless trace may
also appear in binary form. It nevertheless is the same signal as the 'wiggle trace' which it represents, and is not a pure number, and unless form
is to control over substance, the fact that a process result is stated in
computer-compatible form should not be the basis for holding an invention to be nonstatutory.
618 F.2d at 968 n.10.
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statutory process. 4 It could be argued that Bell's method may be
viewed as a process in which sound waves are transformed to their
electrical analogs, transmitted telegraphically, and then transformed back to sound waves. Thus, the sound pulses undergo a
requisite transformation. Yet, the CCPA did not view Bell's invention in such a manner but rather apparently viewed the Cochrane
definition as having a more narrow scope in which the subject matter of the process must be physical matter (such as a chemical
compound) and the transformation must be a physical one. Given
such a narrow reading, it would seem unlikely that Johnson's
claimed invention would be found statutory if the Cochrane definition were the exclusive definition of a statutory process.
Because of the diverse areas of technology in which computers
have application, it is interesting to contrast the scope of statutory
subject matter defined by the Cochrane definition with that defined by the "modified Freeman" analysis. Consider, for example,
the replacement of a mechanical component in a process by a computer. It is possible to replace the mechanical switching devices
used in a traffic light controller with a microcomputer. The sequence of the traffic light is controlled by the computer. A creative
engineer might discover that the switching computer could be
programmed with a remarkable algorithm which, when provided
the appropriate data, would allow the computer to calculate optimum switching times to avoid traffic jams. Although this might
prove to be a popular invention, it is questionable whether or not
it would be statutory subject matter for a patent.
Similarly, a claim for a method of controlling traffic congestion
which specifically called for use of the remarkable algorithm might
or might not pass muster under the "modified Freeman" analysis.
An argument could be made that it would. Certainly, the algorithm
would limit and refine the switching of the traffic lights by affecting duration and sequence of the lights. It would, therefore, meet
the second step of the "modified Freeman" analysis. It would not
seem, however, that the claimed method would be statutory under
the Cochrane definition. What would be the transformation?
There would seem to be no physical act or step performed on any
physical thing, at least within the narrow meaning of those terms.
CONCLUSION

The Patent Act encompasses "any new and useful process...
74. 71 F.2d at 169, 170.
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. improvement thereof.

.

.
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Thus, the scope of statutory

subject matter should be given broad interpretation to serve the
goal of promoting the useful arts. However, this superficial view of
the Patent Act must be tempered by reality. Budgetary constraints
chronically facing all of government assures that the Patent and
Trademark Office will have to operate with limited resources. The
President's Commission on the Patent System recommended that
computer programs be excluded from patent protection because of
the administrative burden required in examination of such applications. 7 The Supreme Court's opinion in Diehr may be an attempt
to strike a compromise between the broad scope given section 101
and the administrative burden resulting from a broad interpretation of statutory subject matter. By applying the Cochrane definition in determining the patentability of a process employing an algorithm, the Court may have been attempting to carve out a
narrow area of statutory subject matter in which processes employing computer programs are patentable. Using the Cochrane definition as a measure would tend to limit the statutory processes to
those that are more traditional. This would lessen the burden of
examination since presumedly the patent examiner would be more
familiar with the conventional processes. As previously noted, however, the Supreme Court's decisions in both Flook and Benson indicated that the Cochrane definition was not exclusive.
In addition, the CCPA's past refusal to accept the Cochrane
definition as the exclusive definition of a statutory process allows
for an expansive reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Diehr.
The Supreme Court's holding in Diehr that a process employing an
algorithm must be patentable as a whole allows the CCPA to use
its own broad definition of a statutory process. Given the CCPA's
expansive view of section 101 this is a likely possibility.
JOHN C. MORAN
MARK E. JAMES

75. 35 U.S.C. § 101.

76. See COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 12.

